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REFERENCES TO THE RECORD
All references to the Record on appeal, as paginated by the
trial court clerk, are designated as "R".

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This

appeal was

poured-over

to the Court

of Appeals

for

disposition by the Supreme Court of Utah on March 8, 1996.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did

the trial court commit reversible error when it

granted Robert M. Mills and Donna H. Mills summary judgment without
considering disputes of material facts contained in the parties'
affidavits?
2.

Did

the

trial

court

commit

reversible

error

in

interpreting an unclear, incomplete and ambiguous contract in a
summary judgment proceeding?
3.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in failing to

recognize that equitable estoppel and part performance are valid
defenses to the statute of frauds in Utah?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is correctness, without deference to
the trial court.

In deciding whether the trial court correctly

determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact, this
Court should review the facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the losing party.

Canfield v. Albertsons,

841 P.2d 1224, 1224-25 (Utah App. 1992)

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
In addition to the documents before the trial court, the file
1

contained a number of admissions to factual allegations in the
Memoranda.

Those admissions were available to the trial court and

are noted in this section. Among the pleadings cited below are the
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
("Mills Memo"); the Affidavit of Robert M. Mills ("Mills Aff.");
and the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Brody Memo").
The following are the undisputed material facts which were
before the trial court at the time it rendered its decision:
The Option to Purchase was drafted by Mr. Pat Brody, husband to defendant,
Jana Jean Brody. (R60,

admitted

in Brody

Mills

Aff

Memo us;

HL3; R30,

Mills

Memo Fact

55/ R76,

The written Option was to expire by its terms

within 24 months of the 15th day of February, 1993. (R9, Option
R13f

admitted

In \8 Brody

Counterclaim)

The Option price was fixed at

$155,000.00. (R9t

Option

Counterclaim)

The Option Agreement requires no advanced notice of its

exercise. (R9r
In Brody

Option

Agreement;

Agreement;

Agreement;

R13,

R39,

Mills

admitted

Memo,

In

5#

\7 ; R76,

Brody

admitted

Memo I 7)

In June of 1994, Brody notified the Mills of her intent to exercise the Option.
(R63,

document

Mills

Memo \10;

as Ex "A" to Mills
R77,

admitted

In

Aff;
Brody

R60,
Memo,

Mills
%10)

Aff.

\6;

R40,

In that s a m e

month, the Mills granted a limited power of attorney to their attorney, Jeffrey C.
Swinton, to close the transaction. (R63, copy of power of attorney;
Mills

Aff.

5 7 ; R40, Mills

Memo, mil;
2

R77,

admitted

In Brody

R60,
Memo,

\11)

The Mills then notified the Brodys in a letter dated June 14,1994, that Mr.

Swinton had been appointed the Mills' attorney to close the transaction on their
behalf. (R60,
admitted

Mills

Aff.

H8; R40,

Mills

Memo,

\12,

pg

3;

R77,

In Brody Memo, HI 2)

The June 14th letter from Mills to Brodys suggested the Brodys contact Mr.
Swinton to make arrangements for the closing. (R55,
Mills

Memo; R40, Mills

letter

Memo, \13; R77, admitted

as Ex "B" to

In Brody Memo, H13)

The Brodys did not intend to remain in the condominium but planned to
move from the condominium and listed it for sale "for several months prior to the
15th day of February, 1995." (R61, Mills

Aff.

R77, admitted

The written lease expired by its terms

in Brody Memo, \16)

on March 1,1995.

(R4-8,

Lease)

m i ; R41, Mills

Memo, \16;

The written lease was orally extended into

March, 1995, and the Mills were required to rent an apartment to live in until the
Condominium was vacated by Brodys. (R61, Mills
Memo, \21;

R78, admitted

Aff.

In Brody Memo, \21)

\14;

R41,

Mills

A letter dated February

10,1995, signed by Mr. Brody, was Federal Expressed to the Mills on February 13,
1995, and received by them on February 14th. That letter stated "we will be
exercising our option to purchase the condominium." (R41, Mills
R77,

admitted

"C" to Mills

In Brody
Memo; letter

Memo, \17 ; R56-57,
only

at Exhibit

letter

Memo, Hi 7;

and receipt,

#2 to Appellant'

There was no written extension to the Option Agreement. (All

s

Ex
Brief)

pleadings)

$155,000.00 was not delivered to Mills on or before February 15,1995. (see
every pleading)

Brody did not tender payment of the purchase price before
3

the expiration of the Option period. (R4ir
in

Brody

Memo,

f ifi;

Mills

Memo, $18;

R77,

admitted

O n the 15th day of February 1995, Mills' counsel sent

a letter to Brody indicating that the Option had expired and that the Mills intended
to return to Salt Lake and live in the condominium. (R41,
R77,

admitted

Memo)

In Brody

Memo, \19;

R58,

letter

Mills

Memo,

as Ex "D" to

$19;
Mills

Brody m a d e no rental payments to the Mills or into escrow after March

15,1995- (R41,

Mills

Memo, \20;

R77,

admitted

In Brody Memo,

\20)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court took the view, based upon a 197 9 Utah Supreme
Court decision, that in the state of Utah when an option agreement
for the purchase of real property is silent regarding when and how
the purchase price is to be paid, it must be paid in full at the
time the option is exercised.

That interpretation of the law was

not appealed and is not presently before this Court.
To reach its decision on Summary Judgment, the trial court
needed only satisfy itself of a few very narrow and undisputed
facts.

The fundamental issue was whether the purchase price for

the property was either delivered
Option Agreement expired.

or even tendered

before the

Of that there is no dispute.

In fact,

none of the facts necessary to satisfy the court were in dispute.
They were either clear on the face of documents or admitted freely
in the pleadings.

The matter was ripe for and deserved to be dealt

with on Summary Judgment.
Appellant claims that the Option Agreement, drafted by her
4

husband, was ambiguous, unclear, or incomplete and therefore the
matter should have been interpreted by a jury rather than by the
trial court on Summary Judgment. Appellant fails to point out that
she had not requested a jury and this was a matter to be ultimately
decided solely by the court.
The

trial

court

drew

from

precedent

in

this

State

and

correctly ruled that an option agreement with a fixed price but
without a provision as to how and when payments would be made is
not ambiguous as a matter of law.

It merely requires payment of

the fixed price at the time it is exercised.
Appellant then argues that because the Option Agreement did
not include an integration clause the burden was on Appellees to
show that the Option Agreement and its attached lease agreement
were intended to be the complete contract between the parties.
There is a presumption in the state of Utah that when the parties
have reduced to writing what appears to be a complete and certain
agreement, that it will be conclusively presumed that the writing
contains the whole of the agreement.

The court was clearly within

its right to find that the Option Agreement and its attached lease
represented the entire agreement between the parties,

There was

absolutely no evidence presented to the trial court of negotiations
or agreements entered

into prior to the time the contract was

signed.
Next, Appellant
appeal, defenses

of

raises, for the very
promissory

estoppel

first

and

time here on

part performance.

Neither those theories nor those words were ever uttered in court
5

or written in pleadings before this matter came up on appeal.

An

appellate court cannot consider issues on appeal that were not
raised

below.

These new issues are apparent defenses

to the

statute of frauds which likely influenced the court's decision.
Even if those defenses had been raised timely, the statute of
frauds precludes any oral extension

(promissory estoppel) of a

written option to purchase real property.
The only evidence of part performance was reference to a phone
call

(which Appellant's concede might have been made after the

expiration of the option) by Appellant's husband to a title company
to open a file for a future closing.

The Appellants suggest that

they made unspecified improvements to the property and provided
absolutely no detail.

No payments were made to or for the benefit

of the Appellees by way of part performance.
Therefore, even if these defenses had been timely raised, they
are without substance.

ARGUMENT
I.
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT:
The trial court concluded that: "The Option required payment
of the entire purchase price within the Option period"; and, "The
Brodys did not timely exercise the Option."
Without question the most important fact which the lower Court
considered in arriving at those conclusions was that $155,000.00
was not delivered to Mills or even to their attorney on or before
February 15, 1995.

This entire matter rests on whether the Brodys
6

exercised the Option on or prior to February 15, 1995.
no facts in dispute on that singular issue.

There are

The issue before the

lower Court was one of law.
The case of Hoffman v. Sullivan, 599 P.2d 505 (Utah 1979)
dealt with the repudiation of an option which stated that it could
not be exercised by its terms before the expiration date of a lease
on October 15, 19 77.

A letter from lessee's attorney was sent one

month before that expiration date, written on September 19, 1977,
and said:
"I realize that this option
before the expiration of the lease
and this notice to you is expressly
an exercise of the option on that
emphasis added)
Both

the

lessor and

her

cannot be exercised
on October 15, 1977,
intended to serve as
date." (Id. at 507,

attorney wrote

back

in

response

stating that she was going to stay in her condominium and it would
not be sold.

The court then noted that the responses of lessor and

lessor's attorney comprised no denial of the right to purchase, but
"simply a flat refusal to sell . . .".

The court held that the

lessee at that point did not need to pay or even tender the
purchase price in light of the prior repudiation.

The lessor

claimed in that case, as Brody has done in this one, that the
Option was unenforceable due to ambiguity because "there was no
provision made as to how and when payments would be made".

Faced

with that question, the Utah Supreme Court clarified Utah law and
ruled that there was no ambiguity because:
"In general, such a provision calls for payment of
cash at the time of the exercise of the option; hence, as
a matter of law, there was no ambiguity as to how and
when payments would be made. " (Id. at 508, emphasis added)
7

Until the filing of Brody's Motion before this Court, no one
had claimed that the contract at issue in this case was ambiguous
because it does not state when payment was to be made.
clear.

Utah law is

"Such a provision calls for payment of cash at the time of

the exercise of the option." (Sullivan at 508)

That is supported

by the two week gap between when the Option was to be exercised and
the last date for occupancy under the lease.

The Mills initially

contemplated arriving home around March 1, 1995, and, in the event
the Brodys timely purchased the condominium, intended and needed to
use the entire cash proceeds, either themselves or through one with
their power of attorney, to purchase another home to occupy upon
their return.
Instead, all the Mills received was a non-committal letter
bearing

a date of February

10

(but inexplicably

not

sent via

Federal Express until February 13th) and delivered to the Mills on
the last day of the 24 month option period, February 14, 1995.
That letter was signed by Mr. Brody and stated only "we will be
exercising

our

option".

importantly, no money.

No

details, no

specifics,

and

most

There was no repudiation by the Mills prior

to the expiration of the option period.

The Brodys knew for 10

months that the Mills had given a power of attorney to an attorney
in Salt Lake to close the transaction before the 15th of February
and admitted in this case having received the letter disclosing
that information.
As the expiration date of the Option drew near, it became
clear that the Brodys couldn't buy the home themselves and, by

8

their own admission, listed it for sale several months before
February 15, 1995.

They were still holding open houses after the

Option expired hoping to find a buyer to give them the money to
exercise the Option.

Perhaps they believed the letter suggesting

that they "will be exercising our option" would pacify the Mills
and give the Brodys time to finalize a sale.
Simply stated, the Option was not exercised.
not

exercised,

determined

to

the
be

lease

period

tenants-at-will

expired
of

the

and

Because it was

the

Brodys

were

Mills.

They

were

unlawfully holding over without payment of rent.
The trial court had before it sufficient undisputed material
facts to make its decision.
other

The inferences from and allusions to

facts Appellant claims were important are red herrings.

There is no genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact.
II. THE COURT DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRET THE CONTRACT ON
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS,
UNCLEAR, OR INCOMPLETE
Brody complains that "the trial court committed manifest error
in interpreting an ambiguous contract instead of allowing it to go
to a jury for interpretation." (Emphasis added)

First, it should

be noted that neither party requested a jury in this matter so the
only trier of fact would have always been Judge Wilkinson, rather
than a jury.
Second, the Option contract was neither unclear, incomplete,
nor ambiguous.

In its ruling that the Option required payment

within the Option period, the trial court likely relied upon the
language in Sullivan, supra, wherein the Supreme Court held, as a
9

matter of law, that an option contract with a fixed price and
without a provision as to how and when payments would be made is
not ambiguous.
"The trial court's finding that there was ambiguity
in the option provision because there was 'no provision,
. . made as to how and when payments would be made' is
insupportable.
The option price was fixed, and as to
that there was no dispute. In general, such a provision
calls for payment of cash at the time of the exercise of
the option; hence, as a matter of law, there was no
ambiguity as to how and when payments would be made. "
(Sullivan at 508, emphasis added)
Brody complains that because the Option Agreement drafted by
her

husband

did

not

contain

an

integration

clause

extrinsic

evidence should be considered to interpret what it meant.

There

was no evidence introduced in the trial court that the written
lease and its attached Option agreement did not incorporate all
prior negotiations of the parties.

In the case of State Bank of

Lehi v. Woolsev, 565 p. 2d 413, 419 (Utah 1977) the court reiterated
a commonly accepted presumption.
"The court properly adhered to the principle that
when the parties have reduced to writing what appears to
be a complete and certain agreement, it will be
conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, that the
writing contains the whole of the agreement between the
parties."
There has been no allegation of fraud on the part of Mills and
the Court properly noted that the Option agreement was drafted by
Pat Brody, husband of the Appellant.

The Option was clear and

unambiguous and therefore requires no extrinsic evidence to aid in
its interpretation.

10

III. THERE WAS NO ERROR IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL AND PART PERFORMANCE BECAUSE NEITHER OF THOSE DEFENSES
WERE RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.
These claimed defenses spin off of the trial court's likely
reflection upon the statute of frauds relating to the claimed oral
extension of the Option agreement.

Courts in this state have dealt

with cases involving conflicting interpretation of oral agreements
following written agreements dealing with real estate.

One case

with unique similarities to our case is Wardley Corp. v. Burgess,.
810 P. 2d 476 (Utah App. 1991).

In that case a six month written

listing agreement expired on January 26, 1989.
claimed

The listing agent

that Burgess, the property owner, orally extended

the

listing agreement on that last day.
"Burgess, on the other hand, asserts that he did not
extend the agreement. Appellants therefore claim that
there was a genuine dispute as to whether the listing
agreement was extended and that summary judgment should
not have been granted." (pg 4 77)
Sound

familiar?

The court, in dealing

with

the

factual

dispute stated at 407:
"Despite the apparent factual dispute as to whether
Burgess did or did not orally agree to an extension of
the listing agreement, summary judgment was appropriate
because any extension to the listing agreement falls
within the ambit of the statute of frauds."
The Court then noted, again at 407:
"The rule is well settled in Utah that if an
original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a
subsequent agreement which modifies the original written
agreement must also satisfy the requirements of the
statute of frauds to be enforceable. Golden Key Realty,
Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985)."
Finally, at 408 the Wardley Court ruled:
"We therefore hold that even if the parties orally
11

agreed to extend the duration of the listing agreement,
as asserted by appellants, the agreement to extend was
void under the statute of frauds.
The trial court
therefore did not err in awarding summary judgment to
Burgess.
'While this may seem a harsh result, it does not
require our apology- The very adoption of a statute of
frauds reflects the Legislature's considered judgment
that, with certain kinds of important arrangements, it is
preferable to invalidate a few otherwise legitimate
agreements because they were not written than to burden
the system and the citizenry with claims premised on
bogus, unwritten agreements-' (last quoting from the case
of Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western Real
Estate and Development Co., 77 9 P. 2d 230 (Utah App.
1989) )
Now, looking to the law of enforcement of oral

contracts

relative to the sale of an interest in land, and defenses to the
statute of frauds, remember, we are here dealing with a written
contract.

The only "oral" part thereof under scrutiny is the oral

phone conversation between Brody's husband

(not a party to the

Agreement) and Robert Mills on or about February 9, 19 95.

The

parties differ dramatically on what was said and what was agreed to
at that moment, but

it is interesting

to examine the written

follow-up letter drafted and signed solely by Mr. Brody sometime
between February 10 and February 13.

That letter bears a date of

February 10, 19 95, and is attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit
"2".

Reading that letter please note the following:
1.

There is no reference to the phone conversation.

2.

Pat Brody

speaks as if he had never had

any

recent

conversation with the Mills when he begins "I hope you enjoyed your
mission. . ."
3.

There is no reference to any prior oral agreement having
12

been reached regarding either the exercise or an extension of the
option.
Brody

It is as if the topic had never been discussed when Mr.

says:

"I

just wanted

to let you know

that we will

excercising (sic) our option to purchase the condominium."

be
One

reading that letter without other background would find no evidence
that there had been any prior discussion or agreement on those
matters.

It is written as if it is an announcement for the first

time--which it was.
4.

Mr. Brody invited the Mills to select a title company in

the letter but later asserts in his affidavit that his contacting
a

title

company

to

set

up

a

closing

was

evidence

of

part

performance.
Turning now to the specific defenses of "Promissory Estoppel"
and "Part Performance" raised by Brody, first it should be noted
that those defenses were raised just now, before this Court, and
were never at issue and never discussed before the lower Court.
There is no referenge to either of them in the pleadings.
The

lower

court

has no

obligation

defenses that are never set before it.

to

raise

and

rule

on

So, likewise, an appellate

court cannot consider issues on appeal that were not raised below.
In LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P. 2d 479 (Utah App.
1991) this Court has said:
"To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party
must timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial
court, thus providing the court an opportunity to rule on
the issue's merits.
See Turtle Management, Inc. v.
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982);
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah App. 1987).
'Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion
are deemed waived, precluding [the appellate court] from
13

considering their merits on appeal.' Salt Lake County v.
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989); accord
Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837
(Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659
P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). Further, the mere mention
of an issue in the pleadings, when no supporting evidence
or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in
support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue
at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for
appeal. James, 746 P.2d at 801."
Relating to the issues, now raised, of equitable estoppel and
part

performance,

Brody,

in

retrospect,

has

discovered

that

allegations in her husband's affidavit lend support, retroactively,
to defenses that were never raised below.

It is too late to raise

them now.
In the event this Court finds that they were raised below and
should be considered, there are a multitude of Utah cases which
have

addressed

the

issue

of

enforcement

contracts, several are worthy of attention.

of

oral

real

estate

The case of Holmgren

Brothers, Inc. v Ballard, 534 P. 2d 611, 614 (Utah 1975) sets forth
the guidelines for enforcement of an oral contract relating to real
property.
The oral contract and its terms must be clear,
understood, and established by clear, unequivocal and
definite testimony, or other evidence of the same
quality.. . . (1) Any improvements made must be
substantial, or valuable, or beneficial. . . (4) Such
acts as are relied on must be exclusively referable to
the contract.
And on page 615:
It only needs to be said that without an oral
contract, its terms, and a mutual understanding, being
proved by clear, unequivocal and definite evidence, there
is no contract to which the claimed acts of part
performance could apply, nor is there a contract which
the court could enforce.
14

(See also Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982) and
Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P. 2d 713 (Utah 1981))
Brody argues part performance by having contacted a title
company to set up a closing for the third week in March,
of any money to the Mills.

No tender

Even if a phone call to a title company

were sufficient "part performance" to establish any rights, there
is no evidence that the call was made before the expiration of the
Option period.

Remember, Mr. Brody invited the Mills to select a

title company in his letter which they received on the final day
for exercising the option.

There has been no allegation below

regarding when that call was allegedly made. Mr. Brody's Affidavit
places it, relative to the February 9, 1995, phone call, as being
"at sometime thereafter"
remembered

that

all

(Brody Aff. 511, R90).

parties

have

acknowledged

It should be
that

a

letter

formally notifying Brody that the Option had expired was sent to
them on February 15th by which it was made abundantly clear that
the Mills considered the Option to have lapsed.

Any actions taken

thereafter were not "referable to the contract" (Holmgren at 614).
In support of her belated theory of part performance, Brody
cites the case of Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 P. 2d 575
1993).

(Utah App.

In that case the court found that the transfer to and

plaintiff's acceptance of substituted collateral coupled with the
grant of permission for defendant to pay, and the payment by the
defendant of $46,000.00 to pay off a pre-existing Continental Bank
loan were sufficient part performance.

That is a far cry from a

phone call on a date unsupported in the record.
15

There is no

allegation of having incurred one cent of additional expense in
that

effort.

The

Holt

standard,

"sufficient performance".
to

set

up

a

future

as

recited

by

Brody,

is

A single phone call to a title company

closing

cannot

be

viewed

as

"sufficient

performance".
Brody

further

argues

having

made

"improvements

to

the

condominium in anticipation of purchasing the property" without
ever stating what those improvements were, who paid for them, when
they were made, or how they benefitted the property.

There is no

evidence to substantiate that claim and certainly nothing that
could arise to the level of the facts in Holt.
The

defenses

of

part

performance

and

estoppel

fail

to

counterbalance the overriding wisdom and force of the statute of
frauds.
raised

The defenses of promissory estoppel and part performance,
only

now

for the

first time, are

too

late and

wholly

unsupported.
CONCLUSION
This is a case where there is no genuine issue at to any truly
material

fact necessary

summary decision.

for the trial court to have made

its

The Option was not ambiguous when drafted.

It

required payment of the predetermined purchase price prior to its
expiration as a matter of law.

Brody had two years to perform and

provision was made and communicated to her about how to close a
sale without the necessity of the Mills being present.
Brody determined to sell the condominium as her only method of
financing the Option and profiting thereby, but simply ran out of
16

time. The attempt by her husband to orally buy another five or six
weeks to close the sale of the condominium to a third party in
order to exercise the Option never rose to the level of a clear,
unequivocal

and

definite

understanding

between

necessary to overcome the statute of frauds.

the

parties

Follow up written

correspondence fails to support the claim of an oral extension.
Evidence of estoppel or part performance, if it could be considered
at all, is insufficient.

The trial court's decision is sound and

should be summarily affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

)C ~ day of April, 1996.
STOKER & SWINTON

J e f f r e y C^7ffisw^ton
Att&cneys (jro^XAppellees
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